BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: Part 2: THE WOLF PACK

Der Deutsche U Boot Krieg im Atlantik (00:01:58m)


The Nazi's called it Die Glückliche Zeit, "Happy Time"  Hordes of German U boats emerged from their bunkers, stationed at Brest, Lorient, La Pallice and La Rochelle, on a nightly search-and-destroy mission. The first "Happy Time" took place in the period from June to October 1940 during which U-boats were able to sink over 282 Allied ships totalling 1,489,795 tons. It was the most daring and most successful naval campaign by the Germans during WW2 and the most humiliating and terrifying situation for the Allies. Britain desperately needed war material and supplies from the United States and Canada, and required massive quantities each week. And the Kriegsmarine knew how to cut the life-line. British vessels were literally sitting ducks. Were Germany to have continued at this rate, they would have easily been able to win the war by attrition.

The Atlantic Ocean and all connecting waterways were the Germans' hunting grounds but they were ordered to avoid the English Channel altogether - the Channel passage was much too shallow and heavily fortified with mine fields. What gave the U-boats such an enormous advantage was that the bases were 450 miles closer to the Atlantic than from other stations in the North Sea. It gave U-boats the added benefit of being able to attack much farther westward and prolong the hunt for longer periods of time. Enormous submarine pens were constructed in France allowing the entire fleet to be docked securely, and completely impervious to Allied bombing. As a result, the numbers of U-boats constructed had doubled.

U-boat bunkers at Lorient, France

CONVOY: DANGERS

On September 21, 1940 the British Convoy HX-72 was attacked by a pack of four German U boats and in the space of two consecutive nights, lost eleven ships and two damaged. The next month, Convoy SC-7, escorted by two sloops and two corvettes, were attacked by a wolf pack and lost 59% of its' vessels. Convoy HX-79 lost a fourth of its fleet despite strong presence of two Allied destroyers, four corvettes, three trawlers and a minesweeper. On December 1st Convoy HX-90 was ambushed by seven German U boats and three Italian submarines. They lost ten ships, three damaged. For the weeks and months which followed, similar attacks ensued, with rising loses for the British Navy and its Allies. The Italian fleet of 32 submarines, stationed at Bordeaux,  frequently accompanied the wolf pack on its missions to attack Atlantic-bound convoys. The Italian fleet, though smaller, managed to sink 109 ships totaling 593,864 tons. However they bore the brunt of heavy criticism from Donitz who considered the Italians to be undisciplined and uncooperative. Convoys were not only prone to attack by U boats but also by the Luftwaffe. Fw200 planes and Junkers Ju 290 flew reconnaissance and bombing raids. In early 1941, the Luftwaffe succeeded in destroying a total of 365,000 tons.





(7/12) Battlefield I: The Battle of the Atlantic Episode 3 (GDH) (00:10:00m)



Britain was nearing the breaking point. Desperate measures had to be taken to protect Allied convoys from further U boat attacks. Churchill proposed an "offensive strategy" by which British aircraft carriers would be deployed to patrol the shipping lanes and conduct anti-submarine hunting missions. In theory it appeared to have merit, but in reality the plan was destined to fail: a U-boat would always be able to spot a vessel approaching and quickly submerge before being detected. Even when aircraft carriers were able to spot a U-boat, their weapons were woefully inadequate to maneuver an attack. In any event, by the time an allied battleship or cruiser could reach the area in which a U-boat was last reported, it would have long since disappeared below the surface of the waves. Despite this flawed British strategy, the Royal Navy would continue repeating the same mistakes for the entire first year of the war.



THE WOLF PACK
 

Submarine warfare was not a novel concept. Reminiscent of WW1, the Germans once again relied on U-boats during WW2 to destroy Allied convoys and in the process strangle Britain militarily. But this time new tactics would be employed. Traditional naval doctrine required submarines to perform only as an auxiliary to surface fleets in their mission to attack enemy vessels. Warships were considered to be the ultimate commerce destroyers - not submarines. But Karl Donitz. who later would become Commander of the German Kriegsmarine, had other ideas. He strongly advocated in favor of converting the entire German fleet almost completely to that of U boats. Donitz was convinced that Germany, with a fleet of only 300 new Type VII U-boats, could easily destroy British oil tankers and starve the Royal Navy of supplies, thus winning the war.




German U-boat in action 1941 (Battle sequence) (00:02:30m)


The new tactic was called the "Wolf Pack", albeit a revised and much improved version of its WW1 predecessor.  Essentially it involved the formation of groups of several submarines, together which could swarm the enemy's defenses and utterly destroy them.  The reason it did not succeed during WW1 was due to technological limitations of German radio frequencies.  However,  during the interwar years, Germany developed two innovations that were almost certain to ensure her military invincibility: the development of ultra-high frequency radio transmitters, and the Enigma cipher machine. 

Two of the five U-Boats in the Eisbar (Polar Bar Group) wolf pack.

The Eisbar wolf pack together sank more than 100,000 tons

 of  shipping in just two weeks off the South African coast. (September and October 1942)

 
The Wolf Pack was a deadly force to contend with. The procedure was straightforward but very effective. A number of U-boats would be dispatched directly into the path where an allied convoy was expected to pass.  As soon as a ship was spotted, its course, speed, and composition would be signaled to German Naval Command. Meanwhile the U boat would continue to stalk the convoy reporting any changes as they occurred.  Upon the order of Command Base, the rest of the pack would close in to the first boat's position and, once in formation, move in for the "kill". The results were devastating and catastrophic.  By dawn, the mission having been completed, the wolf pack would disband, quietly submerging beneath the waves leaving one lone wolf to prowl the seas for the next sighting.   

However,  their tactics were not nearly as effective in the Atlantic since it was extremely difficult to spot convoys in the vast expanse of the ocean.  Consequently, the German Command began to dispatch aircraft on air reconnaissance missions - but even so,  it presented another set of problems stemming from perpetual internal conflicts raging between the Kriegsmarine land and sea divisions.

U-boat attacks were almost always conducted at night and always at the surface, or very near to the surface. It was an idea which Donitz had borrowed from Admiral Wilhelm Marschall who had originated the concept in the 1920s, but for which Donitz later claimed credit. The tactic had the additional advantage of making the submarine undetectable by ASDIC, (Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee), or sonar as the Americans referred to it.  In the early part of the war, the British had not yet equipped their vessels with radar, and lacking any alternative method for effectively detecting U-boats, had to employ what resources they possessed at the time.



SECOND "HAPPY TIME"

War broke out between the United States and Germany on December 11, 1941, and immediately thereafter Donitz launched Operation Paukenschlag (Operation Drumbeat).  Now began the second phase of the Battle of the Atlantic in which German U-boats specifically targeted the eastern coastline  of North America, and what was termed as the "Second Happy Time"  lasting from January 1942 until August of the same year. Just like the first "Happy Time". German U-boats attacked and sunk numerous vessels, escaping virtually unharmed. By the end of Operation Drumbeat, the Kriegsmarine succeeded in destroying 609 ships totaling 3.1 million tons. This quantity was astounding, as it related to one fourth of all shipping stock destroyed by U-boats during the entire war. By the end of Operation Drumbeat, the Kriegsmarine had lost only 22 U-boats.
 

U.S. oiler SS Pennsylvania Sun torpedoed by the German submarine U-571 on 15 July 1942

The SS Pennsylvania Sun was torpedoed  about 200 km west of Key West, Florida but was saved and returned to active service the following year.

In mid-December 1941, the first five Type IX U-boats left the confines of their bunkers in France, and set on their way to different targets of the North American coast. This mission was so secret that each U-boat received orders in sealed envelopes, only to be opened after passing 20°W.  No charts nor sailing instructions were provided.  Such haste was made for the mission, that the captain of U-123, Reinhard Hardegen, had been given, of all things,  two tourist guides to New York City, one in which included a crude fold-out map of the harbor.

Each of the U-boats, upon exiting the Bay of Biscay emitted routine signals, all of which were detected by the British Y-Service. These were Intelligence centres whose sole objective was to collect and analyze data concerning enemy traffic. Amateur ham radio operators even got into the act and provided British Intelligence with invaluable information. Thus they were able to track the progress of the U-boats crossing the Atlantic and dispatched a warning message to the Royal Canadian Navy and to U.S. Admiral Ernest King of a "heavy concentration of U-boats off the North American seaboard".  There were 21 in all.

The U-boats' target was the area from Maine to North Carolina, an area under the command of U.S. Rear-Admiral Adolphus Andrews.  Unfortunately Andrews had to deal with grossly outdated equipment and inexperienced sailors to operate them.  At his disposal were only 7 Coast Guard cutters, 4 converted yachts, 3 WW1 vintage patrol boats, 2 gunboats that pre-dated WW1, and 4 wooden submarine chasers. Though he had 100 aircraft available, they were relegated to training purposes only.  Though reports of the U-boat sightings were passed down the chain of command, hardly any American action was taken.

The first casualty of Operaton Drumbeat was the British freighter Cyclops, sunk by U-123 on January 12, 1941.  Two days later Hardegen reached New York harbor, and spotted the Norwegian tanker Norness off the coast of Long Island, launched torpedoes and sank her, however it took 5 hits to finish her off.   What gave the U-boat a decisive advantage was that coastal authorities had not instituted a black out.  U-boat navigation was made far too easy by the continuing glaring shore lights. The next day, Hardegen actually entered the harbor almost breaching the U-boat in the process and the crew got their first look at New York City in all its glory. They remained in the Harbor just long enough to sink the British tanker Coimbra and exited immediately thereafter.

 

animation of silhouette of vessel against night sky of NYC

The most successful German U-boat was U-221, a type VIIC vessel, under the command of Hans-Hartwig Trojer. She made a total of five patrols in the Atlantic and sank 11 Allied ships totalling 65,589 GRT (gross register tons) and damaged one ship.  The U-boat also destroyed 10 allied landing craft (9 LCMs and 1 LCT) which were aboard the British merchant ship Southern Empress when U-221 torpedoed and sunk her on October 14, 1942.  The U-221 suffered heavy damages, and the U-254 was destroyed altogether when they both collided at sea on December 8, 1942 amidst heavy fog. The collision disabled the U-boat which returned to St. Nazaire for repairs.  It finally met its fate in September 1943 when it was attacked with 8 depth charges released by the British Halifax bomber (58-B Squadron RAF Coastal Command of the southwestern coast of Ireland).  The U-221 sank but not before shooting down the Halifax bomber. All 50 crew members were killed.
 

ASDIC 

ASDIC was essentially a transmitter-receiver which emitted directional sound waves through the water.  Its ability to detect underwater objects (or U-boats) relied on the series of sound waves which bounced off an underwater object and reflected back to the receiver.  The range could easily be measured by recording the length of time it took to transmit and echo back, its visible manifestation demonstrated by a flickering light on the range scale.  The bearing of the target could be read when the transmitter head was maneuvered as if it were a searchlight, thereby making it possible to take a compass reading.

Despite the faith that the British initially held for this device, the ASDIC was not completely reliable.  It often gave false readings especially during bad weather, when ships were rolling, pitching and heaving. The level of noise had to be kept at low or moderate levels - anything over 18 knots created too much signal turbulence.  The transmitter head extended beneath the ship, enclosed inside a large metal dome which was filled with water, and through which the sound waves were transmitted.  It was supposed to minimize the noise made by the rushing water as the ship sped forward.

Canadian sailors operating ASDIC -Photo by William H. Pugsley- National Archives of Canada- PA-139273

Screening operations were very laborious and took a great deal of time. The ASDIC operator had to search through an arc of about 45 degrees each side of the base course of the ship; and it had to be repeated at regular intervals and slow enough to permit the sound waves to return. The recognizable "ping" would be heard when the transmitter detected an object underwater. Otherwise the process had to continue, rotating the head up to 5 degrees each time.

The disadvantages of the ASDIC is that it would often detect all manner of underwater objects besides U-boats, that is, whales, schools of fish, even vertical sea currents and ships' wakes.  Much of the fault for false readings were due to the inexperienced operators, who unlike the veterans, could not make a clear distinction between bad signals and correct ones.

What made it even more frustrating is that the ASDIC often could not even detect the U-boat when it was nearby, due to rough seas, and the varying water temperature at different depths, all of which had an adverse affect on the transmission readings.  The German U-boats easily evaded detection merely by diving to greater depths.

What was remarkable about ASDIC is that it had the capacity to eavesdrop on the sounds of U-boat propeller noises, as well as the operation of machinery, in particular the use of compressed air in the ballast tanks that are responsible for changing the depths of the vessel.  Unfortunately, the opportunity rarely arose since the typical German tactic would be to dive quickly - below the thermal layers,  and move at speeds slow enough to maintain silent running.

It was often difficult for a vessel to maneuver an attack on a U-boat.. The attacking ship had to be certain where the U-boat was, and had to estimate where the U-boat would would be when depth charges were released. Therefore it would be imperative for the attacking ship to take a lead on the U-boat just as would a hunter on his prey.  Far too often contact was lost in as little as 300 yards distance.  It was basically a guessing game, or estimations based on range at which contact was lost.



U-BOAT TACTICS  AND EVASION

The mission of finding Allied convoys was delegated to the German U-boats rather than surface vessels. U-boats were best equipped to find and attack their targets, and escape virtually unharmed. But their capacity to track convoys had limitations; for one thing the bridge was too close to the surface of the water which made it difficult to establish clear visibility.  Consequently they relied on German code-breakers stationed at B-Dienst to decipher Allied radio communications and discover when and where Allied convoys were expected to arrive.  U-boats would spread out along those co-ordinates and shipmates would scan the horizon with binoculars looking out for ship masts, or smoke emissions. Hydrophones were also useful in detecting the sound of ship propellers. Whenever a convoy was spotted, a string of messages were transmitted to German Command as the U-boat proceeded to stalk its prey.  Headquarters would signal other U-boats in the area to head for the same coordinates and once having arrived, the fleet would converge simultaneously, ambushing the convoy.

German U-boat torpedoed allied vessel on the right (sinking)

Even more daring was the strategy devised by German commander Kretschmer by which U-boats would penetrate the convoy's escort screen and attack once positioned well within the columns of merchant ships in the convoy. British radar at the time was incapable of reading target discrimination and range.


U-boats easily out-maneuvered surface vessels, and were able to evade depth charges and Hedgehogs. Typical of the German U-boat tactics  were their tendency to provoke a chase, that is, "run away" from the Allied escort thereby provoking them on a stern chase and, pinging through the wake of the U-boat. (The objective was clearly to give the ASDIC system a hard time.)  And just at the moment in which ASDIC lost contact, the U-boat would take a sharp turn to the left or right, and escape from the line of attack.

A Destroyer Escort dropping a depth charge

 

British sailors loading platform with HedgeHogs

 
The Hedgehog was an anti-submarine weapon used by the British to great success.  It was deployed on convoy escort vessels and destroyers as an auxiliary to the depth charges.  Several small spigot mortar bombs would be fired from spiked fittings and, instead of working on a time or depth fuse, the Hedgehogs exploded on contact.  It resulted in a higher success rate, sinking U-boats more did the depth charges.  A depth charge, on the other hand, used explosives set off by a fuse to ignite at a pre-selected depth, and could be dropped by any vessel, or patrol aircraft.  If successful, the U-boat would be crippled or destroyed.

Leigh Light on RAF Liberator Feb 1944

Another evasive maneuver of the U-boat was to use full power while turning sharply - the intention of which was to create a great deal of noise and confuse ASDIC readings.  Other methods included the release of chemical pellets which when interacted with water would produce voluminous clouds of bubbles to reflect the sound waves transmitted by ASDIC. 

But the most common tactic was for the U-boat to dive very deep and below a thermal layer, or, below the depth at which depth charges would be able to explode.  They have been recorded as having dived as far as 200 meters (600 feet) depths.

Though German U-boats ran on diesel, they had to surface at night in order to recharge their batteries. While on the surface they were at increased risk of being exposed to ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) Radar. The ASV, in addition to use of the Leigh Light (a powerful search light rated at 22 million candela) made it exceedingly more difficult for the U-boats to conduct their night raids, much less recharge their batteries. The Allied trick was to approach the submarine using ASV and then turn on the searchlight at the very last moment. The U-boat had finally become the target, having no time escape.  In an effort to counter these measures, other U-boats attempted to recharge their batteries during daylight hours, when they could detect approaching aircraft.  It was an act of desperation by the Germans, and self-defeating on their part.



THE CHANGING TIDES OF FORTUNE

The Battle of the Atlantic began with a powerful burst of energy, but which over time, began to fizzle out.  Initially, Donitz' intention was to deploy the entire fleet of U-boats in an effort to exert the maximum impact. The plan was impractical because the logistics required to execute such an operation were too unwieldly. To make matters worse for the Germans, the winter of 1939-40 was unusually frigid and brought the entire operation to a complete standstill, leaving several U-boats trapped in ice. Even the German penchant for organization was not refined enough to anticipate this kind of outcome.


On April 9, 1940, the Kriegsmarine was gearing up again. Hitler launched Operation Weserubung, an attack on Norway and Denmark which lasted until mid-June of that year.  Throughout the campaign, German U-boats were suddenly confronted with numerous malfunctions: though they would target Allied ships, their torpedoes would strangely explode prematurely - or not at all.  In many instances, torpedoes would pass underneath the target vessels, leaving them virtually unscathed.  British ships would simply sail away as if nothing had happened.  The malfunctions were the result of interference of the magnetic field on torpedoes launched at such a high altitude. In addition to that, the torpedoes exhibited a slow leakage of high pressure air from the depth regulation gear - a flaw due perhaps to incorrect design or construction. Nevertheless, the Germans resolved this problem merely by capturing some British torpedoes (which were far superior in design, construction, and reliability) and copied its design.

The British scrambled to improve its' security.  After a disastrous first year, British Command finally decided to establish escorts on a permanent, and mandatory basis. It was immediately followed by a surge of new British and Canadian made vessels, as well as American,  Free French, Norwegian, Dutch and Polish. Though the Polish Navy was small in comparison to its more powerful allies, the contribution made by the Polish Navy was extremely vital to the war effort. (see Part 1)





(8/12) Battlefield I: The Battle of the Atlantic Episode 3 (GDH) (00:10m)


As war raged on, a new base was established at Tobermory, in the Hebrides, at which escort ships were put into training, under the command of Vice Admiral Gilbert O. Stephenson. Their only mission was to prepare the escort ships and the crews for the rigors of sea battle.  It was an objective greatly facilitated by the advent of new short-wave radar sets, introduced in 1941, and the co-ordination of supporting Allied aircraft. By spring of 1941, these cumulative changes had a direct effect on the success of Allied missions, most apparent when a U-boat failed to return from patrol. Two weeks later, the convoy HX 112 was able to hold off a U-boat attack: The convoy was protected from the newly formed escort group, which consisted of five destroyers and two corvettes.  In another daring sea battle, the HMS Vanoc was able to ram and sink the U-100, after having detected it on ship's radar.  And on and on it went, the Allies continuing to gain the advantage.  Within a short span of time, the Kriegsmarine had lost three of its top-rate U-boats.(Editors note: Apologies but details not available)

Even though the Allies benefited from the technological improvements, the Kriegsmarine found ways to counter Allied tactics. Donitz devised a new strategy.  In April he dispatched the U-boats further west in an effort to intercept them before escort ships could join the convoys. The plan worked.  Convoy SC26
was hit, and ten of their ships were sunk.  Only one U-boat lost.

By summer of 1941 the British scrambled to provide additional escorts that would accompany convoys throughout the Atlantic crossing, and not just within territorial maritime zones.  British Command called upon the Royal Canadian Navy to provide escorts to convoys in the western zone as well as establish a base at St. John's, Newfoundland.  Commodore Leonard Murray was appointed the Commodore of the Newfoundland Escort Force, under the Command of Western Approaches (Liverpool). The Canadian escort fleet consisted of 16 destroyers, 17 corvettes, and additional vessels of the Royal Navy (7 destroyers, 3 sloops and 5 corvettes), all of which escorted convoys from the Canadian ports to Newfoundland, and from there to Iceland. British escort groups then took over the rest of the way.

Over time it became apparent that the southern Atlantic was just as dangerous to unescorted American merchant vessels.  On May 21, the American ship SS Robin Moor was intercepted 750 miles west of Freetown, Sierra Leone, by U-69. The German captain gave the American passengers and crew 30 minutes to disembark into lifeboats, after which the Moor was torpedoed and sunk. Survivors drifted at sea for almost 18 days before being found by rescue.

Though the United States was cooperating with Britain during the Battle of the Atlantic, they increased their participation considerably. President Roosevelt had originally established the Pan-American Security Zone but soon it was extended it as far as Iceland.  American warships served as escorts to Allied convoys as far as Iceland and engaged in numerous battles with U-boats along the route. When America finally entered the war, a Mid-Ocean Escort Force was established, including American, Canadian and British destroyers and corvettes.



PAN-AMERICAN SECURITY ZONE

Before America entered the war, President Roosevelt, together with leaders of South American nations, and Canada, signed legislation declaring a specific area of the Atlantic to be designated as the Pan-American Security Zone and thereby expressed intolerance of any belligerent acts.  Though essentially neutral,  American ships escorted Allied convoys that were headed for Europe laden with tons of supplies for the British war effort. Initially this Zone extended between 300 and 1,000 nautical miles. (560-1,900 km; or 350-1,200 miles)

President Roosevelt

Early in 1941, the U.S. Navy began sending convoy escorts to ease the burden on British and Canadian fleets, and to report any U-boat sighting to British Command.  The Kriegsmarine was not pleased, but was instructed by the German admiralty to avoid any hostile acts that would give the United States cause to enter a declaration of war against Germany.  By spring of 1941, Roosevelt extended the security zone to a longitude of 26 degrees west, 2,300 nautical miles (4,200 km, or 2,600 miles), east of New York; and 50 nautical miles (93 km, or 58 miles) just short of Iceland.  The tiny island of Iceland thus became the central staging area for the largest naval convoy of the century.


ALLIED VICTORY


By 1943 the war began to turn against the Germans. Nevertheless, Donitz was confident that the increased construction of U-boats would once again tip the balance of power in Germany's favor.  By the end of WW2, the German submarine fleet was the most advanced in the world but failed to reassert itself.  Many factors had converged to destroy the supremacy of the Kriegsmarine. Perhaps a degree of responsibility lay with Donitz himself, who was known to be particularly anxious concerning the daily operation of the U-boats; his relentless questioning and the subsequent transmission of ciphers he demanded presented Allied intelligence with all the details they needed.



Numerous factors contributed to an Allied victory: improvement in Allied convoy tactics, the use of high frequency direction finding (the Huff-Duff), radar, active sonar (or ASDIC, in Britain), depth charges, ASW spigot mortars (called Hedgehogs), the introduction of the Leigh Light, coordination of escort aircraft (and escort carriers), the cracking of the German Naval Enigma Code, and most crucial of all - the full entry and participation of the United States.  By the end of the war, the Kriegsmarine lost a total of 793 U-boats and 28,000 men KIA, a casualty rate of 75%  - the highest rate among any of the German forces during WW2.  In addition, Allied strategic bombing successfully obliterated U-boat shipyards as well as their bases.




U-Boat sunk, 1943 - www.pastfinder.de (00:01:55m)





(12/12) Battlefield I: The Battle of the Atlantic Episode 3 (GDH) (00:05:07m)

NEXT

PART 3

HUNT FOR THE BISMARCK

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC Part 1: TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS

Convoy: War For The Atlantic: Wolfpack Rising 1/5 (00:08:43m)


While battles raged throughout Europe on land and in the air, the greatest military campaign of World War Two was being fought on the high seas. It was the Battle of the Atlantic - the longest series of battles which lasted for the entire six years of the war - from September 1st, 1939 to May 8, 1945.  Thousands of allied ships made perilous journeys sailing through treacherous routes across the Atlantic and back again. Ships criss-crossed the vast expanse of seas - from the North Sea, the Irish Sea to the Labrador Sea, the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, Outer Banks and the Arctic Ocean. Vessels from the United States, Canada, Norway, Poland, Belgium, Greece, Brazil, the Netherlands, just to name few, took part in massive allied convoys. By the end of the war there had been more than one hundred battles asea and as many as one thousand encounters with enemy vessels. The losses of ships and men was disastrous.

Just three days after the start of the war, Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany and launched an immediate blockade.  But it was too late. Ships of the Kriegsmarine had already mobilized during the previous month and were asea ready to launch attacks against the British and French fleets.

Naval Message from Commander in Chief of British Home Fleet

 

SS Athenia begins to go down

The very first casualty of WW2 was the British SS Athenia. She departed Liverpool on September 2nd, 1939 at 13:00 hours carrying 1,103 passengers and 315 crew.  The next day she was spotted 61 miles (97 km) northwest of Inishtrahull, Ireland by the German submarine U-30 and tracked for several hours.  At precisely 19:40 hours Oberleutnant Fritz-Julius Lemp, the commander of U-30 ordered an attack.

Fritz-Julius Lemp

Two torpedoes were launched - the first struck the Athenia while the second misfired. By the next morning at 10:40 hours, the Athenia had sunk. Of the people aboard 98 passengers and 19 crew perished.  The news of the attack provoked worldwide public outrage. The Athenia was an unarmed passenger ship. The German attack upon her was in violation of the Hague Convention and London Naval Treaty which forbade the sinking of any vessel, unless she carried contraband or was conducting military operations.  German propaganda went into full swing in an effort to evade responsibility and accused Churchill for having ordered the heinous attack as an elaborate plot to demonize Germany, as well as an attempt to pressure the United States to enter the war. (NB. It was not until 1946, that German Admiral Donitz finally confessed that their U-30 was indeed responsible.)

Churchill depended upon American assistance and desperately needed the US to join the war. It would be two years before the US entered the war, in response to the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese air force. On the morning of December 7, 1941, the 353 Japanese fighter planes launched a surprise attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, damaging eight US battleships and sinking four others. Also attacked and destroyed were three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, one minelayer, and 188 US aircraft: 2,402 Americans were killed - 1,282 wounded.




World War II: Japanese Bombing of Pearl Harbor (00:01:04m)

In the meantime, Britain had no choice but to face the Nazi threat alone. During the month of September 1939 German U-boats sunk a total of 50 ships (200,728 tons) and damaged 2 ships (16,916 tons). Most were British vessels such as steam merchants, steam trawlers, steam tugs, and motor tankers. About a dozen vessels were of other nationalities including Danish, Finnish, Belgian, Norwegian, Swedish, and French.

On September 14, 1939 the HMS Ark Royal, an aircraft carrier, miraculously escaped an attack by a German U-39. Three torpedoes had been launched but detonated prematurely. Within the span of a few moments the U-39 was sunk by escort British destroyers. (But on November 13, 1941 she was hit by a torpedo from U-81 and sank the next day.  She had survived many "near misses" and was until then considered a "Lucky Ship". )

HMS Ark Royal

On September 17, 1939 the HMS Courageous was patrolling the coast of Ireland when she was torpedoed by a U-29 and sank in twenty minutes. Five hundred and nineteen men, and the captain lost their lives. She was a carrier which served during World War I, and was present when the German Fleet surrendered. She was recommissioned during WW2 and reverted to her original role of patrolling the North Sea.

The numerous losses of the first month and those that were to follow virtually destroyed British morale. But the most shocking event was the cold-blooded and daring attack by a German U-boat on Scapa Flow, a vital British base located at Orkney Islands, in Scotland. On October 14, 1939 at 01:16 hours, the commander of the U-47, Gunther Prien, successfully infiltrated the naval base and launched two torpedoes on the HMS Royal Oak, a British battleship that had served during WW1, and which was laying at anchor. At first the U-47 fired only one torpedo and turned to make a quick get-away. But upon noticing there was no immediate threat from British warships, the U Boat returned and launched a second torpedo which ripped a 9 meter (30 ft) gash in the Royal Oak. She capsized with 833 men aboard.

U-47 departing Kiel for Scapa Flow

The Kriegsmarine planned the attack in retaliation for the humiliation that Germany suffered in its surrender after WW1. The attack was also meant to demonstrate just how easily U-Boats could breach British security.  The length of Scapa Flow measures approximately 312 square kilometres (120 sq mi), with a shallow bottom roughly 60 metres (200 ft) in depth, but most areas no deeper than 30 metres (or 98 feet).

Route taken by U-47 into Scapa Flow to attack and out again

It was an impressive feat on the part of Prien to navigate this waterway so skillfully amid tight British security, to launch the attack and then silently retreat. It set British authorities into a panic.  German Command conferred Prien with high praise for his success and he decorated a war hero.  This was just the beginning of a long and deadly battle.

Incidentally, Scapa Flow is one of the great natural harbours of the world equipped with enough space to contain several navies. More than 1000 years ago, Viking ships used to anchor there. But it is known for being the chief British naval base during WW1 and WW2. (The base was closed in 1956.)




The Battle Of The Atlantic - 01 - The Grey Wolves (1/4) (00:14:46m)


For the next three months, the German battleship Admiral Graf Spee and her sister ship the Deutschland prowled the North Atlantic working in tandem to track and destroy British vessels.  Together they sunk nine merchant ships totalling over 50,000 tons.  British and French navies combined forces to track down the enemy ship.  An allied fleet of 3 battle cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers and 15 cruisers were immediately set asea and eventually spotted the Admiral Graf Spee near the mouth of the River Plate.  Battle ensued but the enemy escaped towards shelter in Montevideo harbor, where in December 1939,  it was scuttled by the crew.

Kriegsmarine vessel Admiral Graf Spee

SAILING CONVOYS

Allied ships and merchant ships were virtual sitting ducks asea while German submarines prowled beneath the waves laying in wait for the opportunity to torpedo the vessels and sink their valuable cargo.  Despite the numerical superiority of the British Royal Navy they continuously suffered disastrous losses; a total of 175 warships, 3,500 merchant vessels, and 30,264 merchant sailors were lost by the British, as compared to the loss of 783 German U-boats and 30,000 German sailors.

Any semblance of hope that the British had in gaining a military advantage over Germany had vanished when France, her biggest ally was conquered by German forces in June 1940.  The Battle of Britain which ensued had fortunately ended with a decisive British victory.  But throughout it England stood alone.  Despite British numerical superiority on the seas, she still relied on the scant number of French ships which joined the Free French forces and a few Canadian built corvettes to make up the shortfall.  British naval forces were strained beyond the breaking point in a desperate attempt to meet with all contingencies.

British ships that had already been allocated to positions in the Atlantic had to be re-assigned elsewhere to meet the immediate threats:  Italy had just declared war and was bent on raiding British and French colonies in the Mediterranean; British forces were deployed in the Norwegian Campaign and the Low Countries, and hundreds of British vessels were dispatched to Dunkirk in the largest naval rescue mission in history - to evacuate allied soldiers from the beaches and harbours.  Churchill called it "a colossal military disaster" and that "the whole root and core and brain of the British Army" was stranded in Dunkirk on the brink of annihilation.




Scene from the Evacuation of Dunkirk (00:01:24m)


In a desperate attempt to minimize Allied losses, British Command implemented a convoy system which at first was voluntary, but quickly became mandatory for all ships. Each convoy consisted of up to 70 unarmed merchant ships carrying goods to Britain - war materiel and supplies that were vital for the continuation of the war effort. Flanking each convoy were one or more escort destroyers, whose mere visible presence was sufficient to deter enemy attack. It so happened that when the German warships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau encountered an eastbound British convoy of 41 ships (HX-106), they spotted the escort, an old battleship HMS Ramillies and immediately fled the scene. No doubt they considered it better to avoid a battle than risk damaging their 15" guns.

Initially the Kriegsmarine were caught by surprise by the sight of escorted convoys but it did not deter them from continuing their terror tactics at sea.  Enemy attacks continued unabated and British losses continued to rise. British Command realized that the convoy defenses were not as secure as originally expected. However as the war progressed the Allies began to gain the advantage.
 

Aerial view of Convoy escorted by Allied Battleship April 1941

SURFACE RAIDERS

On November 5, 1940, in one of the most dramatic and powerful attacks of the Kriegsmarine, the Admiral Scheer fired upon Convoy HX-84 and in the process very quickly sunk five allied ships and damaged several others. The remainder of the convoy was able to escape only because of the sacrifice of the escorting Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Jervis Bay, and the failing light. British Command temporarily suspended all convoys and dispatched the Home Fleet to hunt down the Scheer. They couldn't pin her down. The Scheer virtually disappeared in the South Atlantic area, then reappeared in the Indian Ocean a month later.

The German Cruiser, Admiral Hipper launched an attack on Convoy WS 5A, on Christmas Day 1940.  however were driven off by escorting cruisers. Two months later, on February 12 1941, Hipper encountered Convoy SLS 64 and sank seven of its nineteen ships.

Operation Berlin was launched in January 1941 when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, two infamous and impenetrable battlecruishers that could outgun any Allied ship, was put out to sea in hunt and destroy missions.  With so many German battleships in the Atlantic the British Navy had to scramble to provide battleship escorts to its allied convoys.  It was a prudent move and was directly responsible for saving convoys on two occasions.  The following month, the HMS Ramillies deterred an attack on Convoy HX 106.  In March, the HMS Malaya was able to protect Convoy SL 67.

In the most infamous raid on Allied Convoys, the Germans launched Operation Rheinubung.  A new and powerful German battleship, the Bismarck and cruiser Prinz Eugen were set out to sea to attack convoys but were intercepted by a British fleet off the coast of Iceland.  In the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the British battlecruiser HMS Hood was torpedoed and sunk. The Bismarck was damaged and headed towards France but was bombed by PBY Catalinas, from the carrier Ark Royal. Three days later the Bismarck was sunk by Home Fleet.  It marked the end of the warship raids.

THE POLISH CONNECTION

The Polish Navy was an integral part of the Allied forces in the Battle of the Atlantic. Though they possessed far fewer ships than Britain or the US they nonetheless made enormous contributions in the allied war effort.  Polish ships took part in the Battle of Narvik, shelling shore batteries, and engaging Nazi raiders. They also participated in the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force, shelling the coast around Dunkirk. The Polish ship Blyskawica boldly entered the Dunkirk canal amid heavy enemy bombing and gun fire.

ORP Blyskawica  Polish distroyer- WW2

Crew cleaning  4-inch anti-aircraft gun-ORP Błyskawica 12 September 1940

Piorun (Thunderbolt), Blyskawica (Lightning), Orkan (Windstorm),  Burza (Thunderstorm), and Garland, were the Polish destroyers which protected the English Channel. They also escorted convoys in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, took part in naval operations at Tobruk, Dieppe, Lefoten, Murmansk, Malta, and Normandy, carried valuable cargo to Murmansk and Africa, participated in massive allied landings in North Africa, Salerno, and the D-Day Invasion of Normandy.

The ORP GROM (Thunder) was sunk on May 4, 1940 during the Norwegian Campaign by a German He111. There were 154 survivors,59 KIA, 30 WIA. But before being hit GROM was able to bomb German troops around the Narvik area, and delivered equipment to the HMS Enterprise.

 
The ORP Piorun (Thunderbolt) became famous and celebrated for its role in the hunt for the Bismark. (story in Part 3).  She was originally commissioned for the Royal Navy and christened HMS Nerissa, but after the ORP GROM had been sunk, she was transferred to the Polish Navy as a replacement vessel.

ORP Piorun

 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound

Sir Dudley Pound, the British First Sea Lord decorated several Polish sailors in 1942 for their valor. He made the following statement.

"Last night I asked my Chief of Staff to give me a list of all Polish warships fighting alongside the Royal Navy. I was shocked to learn how few they are because in all dispatches of naval operations and major engagements I almost always find a name of a Polish ship that distinguished itself."  

Among the materiel resources available to the Polish Navy were 8 Submarines, 7 Destroyers, 6 Minesweepers, 3 Escort Destroyers, 2 Gun Boats, 2 Light Cruisers, 1 Torpedo Boat, and 1 Minelayer.  As a matter of fact the command of several British ships were temporarily given to the Poles, including the famous submarine ORP Sokol (formerly HMS Urchin). The Urchin was supposed to have been commissioned to the Royal Navy, but because of the the lack of trained personnel was given to the Polish. The ORP Sokol teamed up with her sister sub the ORP Dzik and earned a reputation for being the "Terrible Twins".   Sokol patrolled the Bay of Biscay off the port of Brest, escorted numerous convoys in the Mediterranean, and took part in naval runs on the port of Taranto and Naples.



Straszne Bliźniaki (Terrible Twins)
Polskie Okręty Podwodne ORP Sokół, ORP Dzik.wmv (00:02:58m)


In October 1941 ORP Sokol scored her first victory, damaging the Italian cruiser Citta di Palermo. A few days later she was able to sink the 2,469 ton transport ship Balila.  In November she succeeded in breaking through the anti-submarine nets, entered the port of Navarino and damaged the Italian destroyer Aviere but was attacked by Italian torpedo boats and destroyers.  They all missed the target.  Sokol was able to escape and in the process was able to launch another three salvos and succeeded in sinking another Italian vessel - a transport steamer of 5,600 ton.

In April 1942, Sokol was heavily damaged by a German air raid and had no recourse but to return to the shipyards at Blyth for repairs.  Within weeks she was back in the Mediterranean harassing enemy ships up and down the coast of Italy, and North Africa. Throughout the war, ORP Sokol sank or damaged about 19 enemy ships totalling 55,000 tons.  All the crew and officers were decorated with Poland's highest medal, the Virtuti Militari.  The records of their bravery are stored in the National Record Office located in Kew, England.

ORP Sokol

In 1939 Polish ships were fewer than 1,000, but by the end of the war had increased to well over 4,000 vessels. Of the total number of men and ships, 404 Polish sailors were KIA, and 5 Polish warships sunk, the largest casualties having occured with the sinking of the ORP Orkan.  Four Polish midshipmen were among the casualties of HMS Hood when the Nazis torpedoed and sunk her.

Though little mention is made of the Polish Navy today, their role during WW2 was nothing short of astonishing. Of the numerous missions for the Royal Navy, Polish ships sailed a total of 1,213,000 nautical miles, escorted 787 convoys, carried out 1,162 combat patrols, sank 2 U-boats and 11 probably damaged, sank 39 Nazi transports and 20 aircraft.  

ORP Sokol Flag

WAR OF ATTRITION

The Battle of the Atlantic was a tonnage war. Throughout the war the allies struggled desperately to maintain a steady flow of vital supplies from North America to Britain; supplies, without which Britain would have surely lost the war.  Convoys of up to 70 unarmed merchant ships, under the protection of British, Canadian, Polish, and later American, air and naval forces, brought food, war materiel and supplies to Britain. There were over 200 convoy routes charted. Over a million tons of goods were required by Britain each week just to survive and to continue the war effort and most particularly to supply weapons and equipment necessary in preparation for the massive D-Day invasion. The United States provided ship and air force escorts in September 1941 based on the Lend-Lease program which came into effect earlier that year. Through this program the US will have shipped over $31 billion of supplies to Britain.

With the rise of Hitler to power, Germany embarked on a massive remilitarization, coded "Plan Z". It not only disregarded all the restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 but superceded its limits to an alarming degree. The German navy had been forced to limit its materiel assets;  no more than 15,000 men, 6 battleships of a maximum displacement of 10,000 tons each; 6 cruisers with maximum displacement of 6,000 tons each; 12 destroyers with a maximum displacement of 800 tons each; and 12 torpedo boats with a maximum displacement of 200 tons each.  Submarines were expressly prohibited.

Hitler earmarked 1938 as the year in which the Kriegsmarine would have achieved its monumental objective of assembling a fleet of 800 ships in addition to 10 battleships and battlecruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 44 light cruisers, 158 destroyers and torpedo boats, various smaller vessels, and 249 submarines.  Quite an ambitious undertaking, but one which had to be shelved virtually on the eve of World War II.  In its stead, Germany reallocated all its available resources towards the construction of U-boats, which together with existing capital ships, armed merchant cruisers and aircraft were more than sufficient to make up for any weaknesses of the Kriegsmarine.

At the very beginning of the war, the Kriegsmarine had only 57 Type II U-boats in her fleet, primarily relegated to the tasks of mine-laying.  The temporary shortfall was quickly remedied and soon massive hordes of German U-boats were prowling the North Atlantic and leaving a trail of destruction in every wake.  Its most effective strategy has often been referred to as the "Wolf Pack",  a technique suggested by Karl Donitz, Commander of German U-boats.  In a memo to Grand Admiral Eric Raeder, he recommended that "effective submarine warfare could bring Britain to her knees."  It almost did.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill

"Without ships, we cannot live." Churchill uttered these words as a dire warning that unless Britain win the Battle of the Atlantic, the consequences would be catastrophic. Fortunately, the tide began to turn in 1943. While the U boat menace persisted throughout the rest of the war, the Kriegsmarine no longer wielded the same degree of threat. A variety of factors contributed to the change of Allied fortunes including an increase in resources and technological developments. First and foremost was their ability to intercept and decipher German Enigma messages, thanks to the efforts of the Polish Underground who cracked the Enigma code before the war even started. The Germans did not suspect a thing!

NEXT

(please click on the following link for Part 2)

PART 2 
 THE WOLF PACK